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The traditional and dominant view among lawyers is
that law is a system and that it originates with the state.
Today’s contrary view among some lawyers and a host
of researchers from other disciplines says that law is
plural in form and in source. Both views seem to rule
each other out, seem to speak different languages, differ
in assumptions and assign different normative tasks to
law. Legal pluralism is the topic of this special issue,
addressed in different ways, from different theoretical
perspectives and in different empirical contexts. The
first two articles in this special issue make clear that the
debate over law as a plural phenomenon firstly bears a
civilizing historical trait, and secondly has an ethnocen-
tric component. Both articles make clear why many law-
yers have a problem with viewing law as plural.
In the first article, ‘Imagining the Rule of Law in Nine-
teenth-Century Britain: Liberal Society and the Dialec-
tic of the Clan’, Marc Weiner presents a cultural-liter-
ary-legal history of the transformation of law, society
and imagination from ‘the rule of the clan’ to ‘modern
liberal law’. Weiner shows how the modern legal system
or ‘the liberal rule of law’ as he calls it, in the nineteenth
century wrestled itself loose from a situation of legal
pluralism. In the previous period ‘the clan’ ruled; each
in-group had its own rules, be it medieval cities, feudal
lords and their servants, the church, guilds, etc.1 In the
nineteenth century, due, among other factors, to grow-
ing state power, the need to govern the increasing popu-
lation, and the upcoming ideology of the nation state, a
national system of law needed to be constructed.2 Wein-
er shows how this was done by reinterpreting the plural
legal past as constraining individual freedom, as arbitra-
ry and as a source of social disorder, while at the same
time as the authentic source of common law’s progres-
sive historical development. In other words, in nine-
teenth century Britain the modern liberal rule of law
focused on the individual was constructed in contrast
with and necessarily tugged out of the disorder of an
arbitrary legal pluralism in which each order focused on
collective processes.
In the second article, ‘How Law Manifests Itself in Aus-
tralian Aboriginal Art’, by Agnes Schreiner, ethnocen-
tric assumptions about law come to the fore. Schreiner
uses two exhibitions at the Utrecht-based Aboriginal
1. See also B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Pres-
ent, Local to Global’, 29 Sydney Law Review (2007); St. John’s Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 07-0080. Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn
.com/abstract=1010105>.
2. See also P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (1992).
Art Museum to state her argument. The modern, West-
ern view of separating law from art (and any other ‘dis-
cipline’) guarantees a hard time of understanding the
Australian Aboriginal view on law. Australian Aborigi-
nal law is ‘presentiated’, she says, through art, and sing-
ing stories, and ritual dance: ‘to make or render present
in place or time, to cause to be perceived or realized as
present’. Schreiner argues that a ritual dance makes law
present, that paintings – even if temporarily in the
sand – make law present, and that law in its turn causes
the land to be present (literally: the land is sung into
existence). Is that still ‘law’, we may ask, and by posing
that question we show our ethnocentric position of
hardly being able to understand law manifesting itself in
any other form than as abstract, systematic, rule-
containing, socially distinct order backed up by state
power. Law as plural phenomenon apparently can be
disorderly, collective-focused and arbitrary, but also art,
song and ritual. Modern law, however, is the negation of
all that. That is why modern law stands in a tense rela-
tionship with legal pluralism. Should we confine our-
selves to a narrow definition of law that developed his-
torically in the West even when we seem to exclude
many existing manifestations of law on our globe?
Emmanuel Melissaris, in the third article called ‘From
legal pluralism to public justification’, tries to find a
concept of law that solves the tension exposed by legal
pluralism. He formulates what he calls ‘by and large a
socio-theoretical conception of law’ that is very open to
the normativity of social groups. He proposes to consid-
er as law the sets of rules on which the belief converges
that these should be followed. People in certain groups
should be able to rationally and reasonably accept these
sets of rules, and if so, these sets should then be consid-
ered legitimate. The exact substance of these sets of
rules should be left to the political field.
Looking back at Schreiner’s argument, the focus on
rules as peculiar for law maybe excludes much of indige-
nous and aboriginal law. Melissaris’ further argument,
however, may find the appreciation of Weiner and prob-
ably Schreiner. He argues that sets of rules of groups or
communities are closed, are inaccessible by people out-
side of that group.3 Non-participants are not able to
share the insights of groups they are not insiders to (or
only a little, because communication may give ‘some
understanding’). This resonates implicitly with Weiner,
whose ‘transition’ in the nineteenth century seems to
3. Reminiscent of N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995).
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have as consequence that it is hard to go back to a previ-
ous way of appreciating law. It resonates explicitly with
Schreiner, since she argues that we can understand Aus-
tralian Aboriginal law only when translated and trans-
formed into familiar Western concepts. Since Melissaris
constructs forms of law on the same measuring rod (‘all
law consists of rules’), understanding is theoretically
possible (even if difficult, and only partly, he contends).
Schreiner argues, however, that Australian Aboriginal
law differs incommensurably from European styles of
law. She would perhaps argue that in order to start
understanding Australian Aboriginal law, one should
perform a ritual, or paint.
The above sketch and summaries of the main arguments
of the first three authors show part of the puzzle of
today’s concept of legal pluralism. We do not pretend
that we can complete the puzzle; with this special issue
we have gathered together important pieces to which
other insights still need to be added. Even though the
idea of legal pluralism has been with law and the sociole-
gal sciences explicitly since the beginning of the 1970s,
it still challenges us (maybe that is its main reason of
existence). In the 1970s it was put forward as ‘the’ con-
cept for understanding the social working of law in
morally and socially plural societies. It was ‘devised’ to
counter the idea that all law was created by the state.
Especially John Griffiths, then one of the advocates of
legal pluralism, critiqued the ideology – as he called it –
of legal centralism.4 In his view, law originated from
below, in groups and organisations in society. The con-
cept of legal pluralism was also developed, albeit rather
implicitly, in order to ‘emancipate’ the indigenous peo-
ples in the (ex) colonies and later also the ethnic minori-
ties in Western Europe and the USA. When you stretch
the traditional concept of positive law, also dominant
among lawyers, and discard the requirement that law is
a ‘state thing’, then indigenous peoples and ethnic
minorities can have ‘law’ too – even if that law is differ-
ent from state law and not codified. That move circum-
vented the accusations of law’s ethnocentrism. The
third, rather implicit, goal of the concept of legal plural-
ism was to open jurists’ eyes to the social reality of law.
Jurists – the message was – need to pay attention to the
empirical reality of law, to law in action aside from law in
the books.
The concept of legal pluralism encountered scepticism
and resistance right from the beginning. As soon as it
was stated as a ‘problem for law’ or as a ‘new paradigm
for the study of law’, its promoters were asked to define
it. This was problematic. Legal pluralism could not be
pinned down in a single definition, because it turned out
to be either too narrow or too broad, while at the same
time empirical definitions stood crosswise at normative
definitions. It could be defined as a social field, as a nor-
mative paradigm, or as a factual situation to be descri-
bed, but with each definition something was left out that
according to researchers should still be included, or the
4. J. Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’, 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism
(1986).
definition was too wide to be of any analytical use.5
Thus, legal pluralism was sometimes firstly used as a
descriptive container concept by including all social rules
– and hence became meaningless for the study of law.
Sometimes, and secondly, the concept of legal pluralism
was used in ways that put all kinds of ordering on an
equal footing normatively – as if from a philosophical
point of view the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights could just as well be traded off with any local
form of customary law. Or to the contrary, the defini-
tion held implicitly that state law should be the norm to
judge all other law. Thirdly, some scholars tended to
forget strategy and power issues, as if questions of domi-
nance and subordination of legal systems (empirically
and normatively) were merely descriptive matters or left
to philosophy to think about – while the question of the
dominance of one type of law over the other of course
also depends on which players in society have the best
resources, more money, more proponents, better access
to the media etc. These factors influence how different
legal systems interact and what the results will be in
terms of a specific mixture of a plurality of laws, and of
rules in one set influenced by rules or concepts from
another system.
Empirical research into actual situations of legal plural-
ism has shown that ‘on the ground’ the interactions and
clashes between legal systems and forms are easily rec-
ognised. Law practitioners and lay people cope in, and
with, those situations, and they know how power and
politics, morality and behavioural routine interfere with
the validity of diverse legal phenomena. The paradox is
that theoretically inclined researchers so far have not
been able to demarcate the field of study analytically.
Some researchers even concluded that there is ‘no pro-
gress’ in the theory of legal pluralism.6 We tend to agree
with that conclusion, and we see it as inevitable, not as a
problem. Legal pluralism did not turn out to be the new
general theory of law, because first it is not a theory but a
perspective, and second because a unified general theory
of law is impossible to formulate. Law is a diverse and
plural phenomenon, and therefore theories of law are
pluralistic, and we need to theorise how they should
relate to one another.
In addition to the three theoretical contributions on how
to view legal pluralism historically, culturally and theo-
retically, we have three more contributions in this spe-
cial issue that each in their own way analyse a plural sit-
uation and from that perspective hope to contribute to a
theory on how to relate plural legal phenomena. The
three ‘cases’ are all very different. The article by Ronald
Janse, ‘A turn to legal pluralism in rule of law promo-
tion?’ deals with the often-encountered problem of
NGOs and monetary agencies in developing countries,
where the implementation or furthering of the rule of
law is frustrated by local situations where people prefer
‘their own law and procedures’. Janse analyses why it is
so difficult to take local legal forms into account, basi-
5. S.E. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 22 Law and Society Review (1988).
6. See Tamanaha, above n. 1, at 29 and further.
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cally arguing that the ideology of state-centred, uni-
form, non-personal abstract legal system is the largest
barrier to developing a workable situation. Lawyers sim-
ply assume that non-state law is basically the same as
state law, only not codified and not enforced by state
authorities. Moreover, their normative assumption is
that state law should be the legal system that regulates
the existences of non-state law, in other words that state
law is rightfully the dominant set of rules. These
assumptions and expectations lead to the conclusion that
rule of law and legal pluralism is not a very happy mar-
riage.
The next article covers a situation closer to the home of
the ordinary lawyer. Urszula Jaremba, in her contribu-
tion ‘At the Crossroads of National and European
Union Law; Experiences of National Judges in a Multi-
level Legal Order’, describes empirically how Polish,
German and Dutch civil law judges do or do not take
account of European legal rules. And for this multilay-
ered legal order to work, the first thing judges simply
need is knowledge. The judges who were surveyed and
interviewed made clear they do not encounter European
law very much in their daily work, they do not know
much about it, they do not feel they are well equipped,
and it takes too much time to delve into it. The conse-
quence of this is that these civil law judges tend to evade
even contemplating applying European legal rules in
national civil law cases. Although doctrine states that
European law is part of the national law of the European
member states, for these judges it appears as a foreign
system, which they prefer to leave alone.
The final ‘case study of legal pluralism’ takes us to the
Middle East, to Syria in particular. Esther van Eijk in
her article, ‘Unity in Multiplicity: Shared Cultural
Understandings on Marital Life in a Damascus Catholic
and Muslim Court’, describes in detail and analyses how
different religious family laws are applied in courts
while under the patronage of a state legal system that
leaves them room to do so. It makes for an interesting
situation. Van Eijk argues that even though Syrian state
law leaves room for the application of Catholic and
Muslim family law and these laws differ in important
aspects, the underlying social rules on marriage and
gendered roles among Catholics and Muslims have
much in common. In other words, a plurality of formal
law should not blind us to a shared social normativity.
Theorising a little further on how a plurality of laws
should be conceptualised in a framework that does jus-
tice to each of them, we think the following elements
can be gathered from the collected articles in this special
issue, which merit further thought. The first three arti-
cles open up space to a more inclusive approach of the
multiple forms law manifests itself. The sociolegal point
of departure could be a conventionalist approach to law
(law is what certain social groups conventionally call
law). We should remember that our present concept of
law as systematic and tied to the power of the state is the
result of a contingent historical development that is not
necessarily universal. This does not mean, however, that
we need to give up our concept of law, but neither
should we discard other concepts as irrelevant or ‘not up
to modern standards’ beforehand.
The next question is how to deal with this plural legal
situation normatively. We opt for a pragmatic approach
and formulate three basic requirements. The first
requirement can be derived from the article by Janse on
furthering the rule of law in developing countries, in
line with what we said above. We should oppose the
automatic notion that Western systematic and codified
law is the best and most developed law there is. Arro-
gance has no place in a globalised world. That is not to
say we need to be humble. Western law has certain
advantages like legal certainty, the principle of equality,
the ideal of the rule of law, etc. We should stress these
advantages in local and global argumentative arenas.
A second necessary step, which becomes clear from the
work of Jaremba, is knowledge dissemination. Without
knowledge of other forms of law, especially those legal
professionals and other actors who work with the domi-
nant set of rules will not be able to give law a legitimate
meaning. Similarly, people working with less-known
concepts of law should have knowledge of other legal
phenomena.
The third aspect, deduced from Van Eijk, is that we
should not forget that law in books and law in action are
not two sides of the same coin. They may differ consid-
erably. In situations in which a minority people press or
ask for respect for ‘their own law’, it could be that the
demand is partly political, part of power struggles in the
group or deemed important for developing a distinct
identity. The actual interpretations of the rules and
their social implications may well be very close to those
of the dominant group. Two different laws in books
(belonging to two different legal orders) may very well
have quite similar laws in action.
In summary, our three elements to further theorise how
to deal with legal pluralism in a pragmatic and norma-
tive sense are that actors should argue openly and with-
out prejudice that they should have wide knowledge of
different forms of law, and that they should realise that
however well designed a legal regulation may be, the
empirical reality on the ground may find its own and at
times unexpected form.
Even though this special issue on legal pluralism is nec-
essarily diverse in approaches, disciplines and empirical
grounding, we feel we have taken two steps forward in
looking at law as a plural phenomenon. Maybe we now
need to take one step back, but that would still mean
progress.
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